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Abstract— This paper introduces a novel concept from coali-
tional game theory which allows the dynamic formation of
coalitions among wireless nodes. A simple and distributed
merge and split algorithm for coalition formation is constructed.
This algorithm is applied to study the gains resulting from
the cooperation among single antenna transmitters for virtual
MIMO formation. The aim is to find an ultimate transmitters
coalition structure that allows cooperating users to maximize
their utilities while accounting for the cost of coalition for-
mation. Through this novel game theoretical framework, the
wireless network transmitters are able to self-organize and form
a structured network composed of disjoint stable coalitions.
Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can im-
prove the average individual user utility by 26.4% as well as
cope with the mobility of the distributed users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, cooperation between mobile devices has been
one of the main activities of research work which tackled
different aspects of cooperation at different layers. For in-
stance, the problem of cooperation among single antenna
receivers for virtual MIMO formation has been studied in [1]
using coalitional game theory. The authors in [1] proved that
for the receiver coalition game in a Gaussian interference
channel and synchronous CDMA multiple access channel
(MAC), a stable grand coalition of all users can form if no
cost for cooperation is considered. Cooperation among single
antenna transmitters and receivers in ad hoc networks has
also been studied in [2]. The authors inspected the capacity
gains that users can achieve while cooperating; namely at
the transmitter side. Cooperation in wireless networks was
also exploited at higher layers such as the network layer
using game theory. For instance, cooperation in routing
protocols was tackled in [3] where selfish nodes are allowed
to cooperate for reducing the routing energy cost. In [4] and
[5], the nodes along the route can cooperate with each other
in order to improve the link quality or reduce the power
consumption. Cooperation for packet forwarding is studied
in [6] and [7] using cooperative game theory, repeated game
theory, and machine learning. Auction theory is used in
[8] for optimizing relay resource allocation in cooperative
networks. Thus, previous work mainly focused on the study
of the gains resulting from virtual MIMO as well as from
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higher layer cooperation. For virtual MIMO, the usage of
coalitional games was limited to the study of the formation
of the grand coalition when the users cooperate without cost.
However, due to cooperation costs, it might not be beneficial
for users located far away from each other to cooperate.
The main contribution of this article is to derive a fair
cooperation strategy among distributed single antenna trans-
mitters, which will allow these users to self-organize into
structured coalitions while maximizing their utilities with
cost. For this purpose, we construct a coalition formation
algorithm based on a novel concept from coalitional game
theory which, to our knowledge, have not been used in the
wireless world yet. A simple and distributed merge and split
algorithm is devised for forming the coalitions. Through this
algorithm, we seek to find the possible coalition structures
in the transmitter cooperation game. The convergence of the
algorithm is proven and the stability of the resulting partitions
is investigated. Different fairness criteria for dividing the
extra benefits among the coalition users are also discussed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model. In Section III, we present the
proposed algorithm, prove its properties and discuss the fair-
ness criteria. Simulation results are presented and analyzed
in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network having Mt single antenna transmitters,
e.g. mobile users, sending data in the uplink to a fixed
receiver, e.g. a base station, with Mr receivers (Multiple
Access Channel). Denote N = {1 . . .Mt} as the set of all
Mt users in the network, and let S ⊂ N be a coalition
consisting of |S| users. We consider a TDMA transmission
in the network, thus, in a non-cooperative manner, the Mt
users require a time scale of Mt slots since every user
occupies one slot. When cooperating, the single antenna
transmitters form different disjoint coalitions and the coali-
tions will subsequently transmit in a TDMA manner, that is
one coalition per transmission. Thus, during the time scale
Mt, each coalition is able to transmit within all the time
slots previously held by its users. In addition, similar to [2]
we define a fixed transmitting power constraint P˜ per time
slot (i.e. per coalition) which is the power available for all
transmitters that will occupy this slot. If a coalition (viewed
as a single user MIMO after cooperation) will occupy the
slot, part of the transmit power constraint will be used for
actual transmission while the other part will constitute a cost
for the exchange of information between the members of
the coalition. This cost is taken as the sum of the powers
required by each user in a coalition S to broadcast to its
corresponding farthest user inside S. For instance, the power
needed for broadcast transmission between a user i ∈ S and
its corresponding farthest user iˆ ∈ S is given by
P¯i,ˆi =
ν0 · σ
2
h2
i,ˆi
, (1)
where ν0 is a target SNR for information exchange, σ2 is the
noise variance and hi,ˆi =
√
κ/dα
i,ˆi
is the path loss between
users i and iˆ; κ being the path loss constant, α the path
loss exponent and di,ˆi the distance between users i and iˆ. In
consequence, the total power cost for a coalition S having
|S| users is given by PˆS as follows
PˆS =
|S|∑
i=1
P¯i,ˆi. (2)
It is interesting to note that the defined cost depends on the
location of the users and the size of the coalition; hence a
higher power cost is incurred whenever the distance between
the users increases or the coalition size increases. Thus, the
actual power constraint per coalition S is given by
PS = (P˜ − PˆS)
+,with a+ , max (a, 0) (3)
In the considered TDMA system, each coalition transmits
in a time slot, hence, perceiving no interference from other
coalitions during transmission. Therefore, in a time slot,
the sum-rate of the virtual MIMO system formed by a
coalition S, assuming Gaussian signalling and under a power
constraint PS , is given by [9] as
CS = max
Q
S
I(xS ;yS) = max
Q
S
log det(IMr +HS ·QS ·H
†
S),
(4)
where xS and yS are, respectively, the transmitted and
received signal vectors of coalition S, QS = E [xS · x
†
S ]
is the covariance of xS with tr[QS ] ≤ PS and HS is the
Mr ×Mt channel matrix with H†S its conjugate transpose.
In this work, we consider a path-loss based determin-
istic channel matrix HS assumed perfectly known at the
transmitter and receiver with each element hi,j =
√
κ/dαi,j
with di,j the distance between transmitter i and receiver
j. For such a channel, the work in [9] shows that the
maximizing input signal covariance QS is given by QS =
V SDSV
†
S ; with tr[DS ] = tr[QS ] where V S is the uni-
tary matrix given by the singular value decomposition of
HS = USΣSV
†
S . DS is an Mt × Mt diagonal matrix
given by DS = diag(D1, . . . , DK , 0, . . . , 0) where K ≤
min (Mr,Mt) represents the number of positive singular
values of HS (eigenmodes) and each Di given by
Di = (µ− λ
−1
i )
+. (5)
µ is determined by water-filling to satisfy the coalition
power constraint tr[QS ] = tr[DS ] =
∑
iDi = PS and
λi represents the ith eigenvalue of H†SHS . Hence, based
on [9], the resulting capacity for a coalition S is given by
CS =
∑K
i=1(log (µλi))
+
.
Consequently, over the TDMA time scale of Mt, for every
coalition S ⊂ N , we define the utility function as
v(S) =
{
|S| · CS , if PS > 0,
0, otherwise.
(6)
This utility represents the total capacity achieved by coalition
S during the time scale Mt while accounting for the cost
through the power constraint. The second case states that
if the power cost within a coalition is larger than or equal
the constraint, then the coalition cannot form. Thus, we have
a coalitional game (N ,v) with a transferable utility and we
seek, through coalition formation, a coalition structure that
will allow the users to maximize their utilities in terms of
rate with cost in terms of power.
III. COALITION FORMATION
A. Coalition Formation Algorithm
Unlike existing literature, in the proposed transmitter co-
operation (N ,v) game, we will prove that the grand coalition
cannot form due to cost.
Definition 1: A coalitional game (N, v) with a transfer-
able utility is said to be superadditive if for any two disjoint
coalitions S1, S2 ⊂ N , v(S1
⋃
S2) ≥ v(S1) + v(S2).
Theorem 1: The proposed transmitter (N ,v) coalitional
game with cost is, in general, non-superadditive.
Proof: Consider two disjoint coalitions S1 ⊂ N and
S2 ⊂ N in the network, with the users of S1
⋃
S2 located
far enough to yield a power cost per (2) PˆS1 SS1 > P˜ .
Therefore, by (3) PS1 SS2 = 0 yielding v(S1
⋃
S2) = 0 <
v(S1) + v(S2) (6); hence the game is not superadditive.
Definition 2: A payoff vector z = (z1, . . . , zMt) is said
to be group rational or efficient if
∑Mt
i=1 zi = v(N). A
payoff vector z is said to be individually rational if the
player can obtain the benefit no less than acting alone, i.e.
zi ≥ v({i})∀i. An imputation is a payoff vector satisfying
the above two conditions.
Definition 3: An imputation z is said to be unstable
through a coalition S if v(S)>
∑
i∈S zi, i.e., the players
have incentive to form coalition S and reject the proposed
z. The set C of stable imputations is called the core, i.e.,
C =
{
z :
∑
i∈N
zi = v(N) and
∑
i∈S
zi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊂ N
}
.
(7)
A non-empty core means that the players have an incentive
to form the grand coalition.
Theorem 2: In general, the core of the proposed (N ,v)
coalitional game is empty.
Proof: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, consider a
TDMA network composed of only two disjoint coalitions S1
and S2 with v(S1
⋃
S2 = N) = 0. In this case, no imputation
can be found to lie in the core, since the value of the grand
TABLE I
ONE STAGE OF THE PROPOSED MERGE AND SPLIT ALGORITHM
Step 1: Coalition Formation Phase: Arbitrary Merge and Split Rules
Step 2: Transmission Phase: One Coalition per Slot
coalition is v(N) = 0. Thus, in such a case, S1 and S2 will
have a better performance in a non-cooperative mode and the
core of the transmitter cooperation (N ,v) game is empty.
As a result of the non-superadditivity of the game and
the emptiness of the core, the grand coalition does not form
among cooperating transmitters. Instead, independent disjoint
coalitions will form in the network. Therefore, we seek a
novel algorithm for coalition formation that accounts for the
properties of the transmitter cooperation game with cost.
An interesting approach for coalition formation through
simple merge and split operations is given by [10]. We define
a collection of coalitions S in the grand coalition N as the
family S = {S1, . . . , Sl} of mutually disjoint coalitions Si
of N . In other words, a collection is any arbitrary group
of disjoint coalitions Si of N not necessarily spanning
all players of N . In addition, a collection S of coalitions
encompassing all the players of N , that is
⋃l
j=1 Sj = N is
called a partition of N . Moreover, the merge and split rules
defined in [10] are simple operations that allow to modify a
partition T of N as follows
• Merge Rule: Merge any set of coalitions
{S1, . . . , Sk} where
∑k
j=1 v(Sj) < v(
⋃k
j=1 Sj);
thus {S1, . . . , Sk} →
⋃k
j=1 Sj .
• Split Rule: Split any set of coalitions
⋃k
j=1 Sj
where
∑k
j=1 v(Sj) > v(
⋃k
j=1 Sj); thus
⋃k
j=1 Sj →
{S1, . . . , Sk}.
As a result, a group of coalitions (or users) decides to merge
if it is able to improve its total utility through the merge;
while a coalition splits into smaller coalitions if it is able
to improve the total utility. Moreover, it is proven in [10]
that any iteration of successive arbitrary merge and split
operations terminates.
A coalition formation algorithm based on merge and split
can be formulated for wireless networks. For instance, for
the transmitter cooperation game, each stage of our coalition
formation algorithm will run in two consecutive phases
shown in Table I: adaptive coalition formation, and then
transmission. During the coalition formation phase, the users
form coalitions through an iteration of arbitrary merge and
split rules repeated until termination. Following the self orga-
nization of the network into coalitions, TDMA transmission
takes place with each coalition transmitting in its allotted
slots. Subsequently, the transmission phase may occur several
times prior to the repetition of the coalition formation phase,
notably in low mobility environments where changes in the
coalition structure due to mobility are seldom.
B. Stability Notions
The work done in [10] studies the stability of a partition
through the concept of defection function.
Definition 4: A defection function D is a function which
associates with any arbitrary partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl}
(each Ti is a coalition) of the players set N a family
(i.e. group) of collections in N .
Two important defection functions can be pinpointed.
First, the Dhp(T ) function (Dhp) which associates with each
partition T of N the family of all partitions of N that the
players can form through merge and split operations applied
to T . This function allows any group of players to leave
the partition T of N through merge and split operations to
create another partition in N . Second, the Dc(T ) function
(Dc) which associates with each partition T of N the family
of all collections in N . This function allows any group of
players to leave the partition T of N through any operation
and create an arbitrary collection in N . Two forms of stability
stem from these definitions: Dhp stability and a stronger strict
Dc stability. In fact, a partition T is Dhp-stable, if no players
in T are interested in leaving T through merge and split to
form other partitions in N ; while a partition T is strictly Dc-
stable, if no players in T are interested in leaving T to form
other collections in N (not necessarily by merge and split).
Theorem 3: Every partition resulting from our proposed
merge and split algorithm is Dhp-stable.
Proof: A network partition T resulting from the pro-
posed merge and split algorithm can no longer be subject
to any additional merge or split operations as successive
iteration of these operations terminate [10]. Therefore, the
users in the final network partition T cannot leave this
partition through merge and split and the partition T is
immediately Dhp-stable.
Nevertheless, a stronger form of stability can be sought
using strict Dc-stability. The appeal of a strictly Dc stable
partition is two fold [10]: 1) it is the unique outcome of any
arbitrary iteration of merge and split operations done on any
partition of N ; 2) it is a partition that maximizes the social
wellfare which is the sum of the utilities of all coalitions in
a partition. However, the existence of such a partition is not
guaranteed. In fact, the authors in [10] showed that a partition
T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of the whole space N is strictly Dc-stable
only if it can fulfill two necessary and sufficient conditions:
1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and each pair of disjoint
coalitions S1 and S2 such that {S1 ∪ S2} ⊂ Ti we
have v(S1
⋃
S2) > v(S1) + v(S2).
2) For the partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} a coalition G ⊂
N formed of players belonging to different Ti ∈ T
is T -incompatible, that is for no i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we
have G ⊂ Ti. Strict Dc-stability requires that for all
T-incompatible coalitions G,
∑l
i=1 v(Ti ∩G) > v(G).
Therefore, in the case where a partition T of N satisfying
the above two conditions exists; the proposed algorithm
converges to this optimal strictly Dc-stable partition since
it constitutes a unique outcome of any arbitrary iteration of
merge and split. However, if no such partition exists, the pro-
posed algorithm yields a final network partition that is Dhp-
stable. In the transmitter cooperation game, the first condition
of Dc-stability depends on the users location in the network
due to cost of cooperation. In fact, it is well known [9] that, in
an ideal case with no cost for cooperation, as the number of
transmit antennas are increased for a fixed power constraint,
the overall system’s diversity increases. In fact, consider a
partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of N , and any two disjoint
coalitions S1 and S2 such that {S1∪S2} ⊂ Ti. Assuming that
no cost for cooperation exists, the capacity of the coalition
S1
⋃
S2, denoted CS1 SS2 , is larger than the capacities CS1
and CS2 of the coalitions S1 and S2 acting non-cooperatively
(due to the larger number of antennas in S1
⋃
S2); thus
|S1
⋃
S2| · CS1
S
S2 > |S1
⋃
S2| · max (CS1 , CS2) with
|S1
⋃
S2| = |S1|+ |S2|. As a result CS1 SS2 satisfies∣∣∣S1⋃S2∣∣∣ · CS1 SS2 > |S1| · CS1 + |S2| · CS2 . (8)
In fact, (8) yields v(S1
⋃
S2) > v(S1) + v(S2) which is the
necessary condition to verify the first Dc-stability condition.
However, due to the cost given by (2) CS1 SS2 , CS1 and CS2
can have different power constraints due to the power cost,
i.e. users location, and this condition is not always verified.
Therefore, in practical networks, guaranteeing the first condi-
tion for existence of a strictly Dc-stable partition is random
due to the random location of the users. Furthermore, for
a partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl}, the second condition of Dc-
stability is also dependent on the distance between the users
in different coalitions Ti ∈ T . In fact, as previously defined,
for a partition T a T-incompatible coalition G is a coalition
formed out of users belonging to different Ti ∈ T . In order
to always guarantee that
∑l
i=1 v(Ti ∩ G) > v(G) it suffice
to have v(G) = 0 for all T-incompatible coalitions G. In a
network partition T where the players belonging to different
coalitions Ti ∈ T are separated by large distances, any T-
incompatible coalition G will have v(G) = 0 based on (6)
and, thus, satisfying the second Dc-stability condition.
Finally, the proposed algorithm can be implemented in
a distributed way. Since the user can detect the strength
of the other users’ uplink signals, the nearby users can be
discovered. By using a signalling channel, the distributed
users can exchange some channel information and then
perform the merge and split algorithm. The signalling for
this handshaking can be minimal.
C. Fairness Criteria for Distributions within Coalition
In this section, we present possible fairness criteria for
dividing the coalition worth among its members.
1) Equal Share Fairness: The most simple division
method is to divide the extra equally among users. In other
words, the utility of user i among the coalition S is
zi =
1
|S|

v(S)−∑
j∈S
v({j})

+ v({i}). (9)
2) Proportional Fairness: The equal share fairness is a
very simple and strict fairness criterion. However, in practice,
the user experiencing a good channel might not be willing to
cooperate with a user under bad channel conditions, if the ex-
tra is divided equally. To account for the channel differences,
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Fig. 1. A snapshot example of coalition formation.
we use another fairness criterion named proportional fairness,
in which the extra benefit is divided in weights according to
the users’ non-cooperative utilities. In other words,
zi = wi

v(S)−∑
j∈S
v({j})

+ v({i}), (10)
where
∑
i∈S wi = 1 and within the coalition
wi
wj
=
v({i})
v({j})
, (11)
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
For simulations, the base station (BS) is placed at the
origin with Mr = 3 antennas, and random users are located
within a square of 2 km × 2 km around the BS. The power
constraint per slot is P˜ = 0.01 W, the SNR for information
exchange is ν0 = 10 dB and the noise level is −90 dBm.
The propagation loss is α = 3 and κ = 1.
In Fig. 1, we show a snapshot of a network with Mt = 6
users. Using the proposed merge and split protocol, clusters
of users are formed for distributed closely located users.
Moreover, the coalition structure in Fig. 1 is strictly Dc-
stable, thus, it is the unique outcome of any iteration of merge
and split. The strict Dc stability of this structure is immediate
since a partition verifying the two conditions of Section III-B
exists. For the first condition, strict superadditivity within
the coalitions is immediately verified by merge rule due
to having two users per formed coalition. For the second
condition, any T-incompatible coalition will have a utility of
0 since the users in the different formed coalitions are too
far to cooperate. For example, consider the T-incompatible
coalition {2, 3}, the distance between users 3 and 2 is
1.33 km yielding per (1) and (2) a power cost Pˆ{2,3} =
0.052 W > P˜ = 0.01 W thus, by (6) v({2, 3}) = 0. This
result is easily verifiable for all T-incompatible coalitions.
In Fig. 2, we show how the algorithm handles mobility.
The network setup of Fig. 1 is used and User 6 moving from
the left to right for 2.8 km. When User 6 moves to the right
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Fig. 2. Coalition merging/splitting due to mobility.
TABLE II
PAYOFF DIVISION ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT FAIRNESS
User 2 User 4 User 6
Equal division 3.7310 3.6761 3.9993
Proportional fair 3.6155 3.6968 4.0940
first, it becomes closer to the BS and its utility increases and
so does the utility of User 1. However, when the distance
between Users 1 and 6 increases, the cost increases and both
users’ payoffs drop. As long as the distance covered by User
6 is less than 0.6 Km, the coalition of Users 1 and 6 can
still bring mutual benefits to both users. After that, splitting
occurs and User 1 and User 6 transmit independently. When
User 6 move about 1.2 Km, it begins to distance itself from
the BS and its utility begins to decrease. When User 6 moves
about 2.5 km, it will be beneficial to users 2, 4 and 6 to form
a 3-user coalition through the merge rule since v({2, 4, 6}) =
10.8883 > v({2, 4})+ v({6}) = 6.5145+ 3.1811 = 9.6956.
As User 6 moves further away from the BS, User 2 and User
4’s utilities are improved within coalition {2, 4, 6}, while
User 6’s utility decreases slower than prior to merge.
Table II shows the payoff division among coalition users
when the mobile User 6 moves 2.7 km in Fig. 2. In this
case, we have v({2}) = 2.4422, v({4}) = 2.4971, v({6}) =
2.7654 and v({2, 4, 6}) = 11.4063. Compared with the equal
division, proportional fairness gives User 6 the highest share
of the extra benefit and User 2 the lowest share because
User 6 has a higher non-cooperative utility than User 2.
Thus, Table II shows how different fairness criteria can yield
different apportioning of the extra cooperation benefits.
In Fig. 3, we show the average individual user payoff
improvement as a function of the number of users in the
networks. Here we run the simulation for 10000 different
random locations. For cooperation with coalitions, the av-
erage individual utility increases with the number of users
while for the non-cooperative approach an almost constant
performance is noted. Cooperation presents a clear perfor-
mance advantage reaching up to 26.4% improvement of the
average user payoff at Mt = 50 as shown in Fig. 3.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we construct a novel game theoretical al-
gorithm suitable for modeling distributed cooperation with
cost among single antenna users. Unlike existing literature
which sought algorithms to form the grand coalition of
transmitters; we inspected the possibility of forming disjoint
independent coalitions which can be characterized by novel
stability notions from coalitional game theory. We proposed a
simple and distributed merge and split algorithm for forming
coalitions and benefiting from spatial gains. Various prop-
erties of the algorithm are exposed and proved. Simulation
results show how the derived algorithm allows the network
to self-organize while improving the average user payoff by
26.4% and efficiently handling the distributed users’ mobility.
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